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Abstract: This chapter analyses tropical forests as objects of neoliberal environmental 
governmentality regimes which combine a range of discourses, rationalities and 
techniques and legal regimes with the aim of conserving them as sources of livelihoods 
and carbon sinks by treating them as sources of profit best managed by market forces. 
The chapter discusses the discourses of green governmentality and ecological 
modernisation and the degree to which technology enables forests to be surveilled, 
monitored and measured and their inhabitants subjected to market discipline under 
REDD+ regime. It examines indigenous rights and the unexpected inclusion of REDD+ 
as a standalone article in the Paris Agreement. A discussion of the vexed relationship 
between international environmental law and neoliberal environmental governmentality 
is discussed provides the basis for the conclusion that conflicting principles and 
inadequate enforcement mechanisms limit the efficacy of international environmental 
law and suggest that effective forest governance which safeguards the interests of 
forest dwellers ultimately depends as much on political will as legal regulation. 
 
Introduction 
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Forests cover roughly a third of the Earth’s land surface and are home to as much as 
ninety per cent of land-based animal and plant life. They provide food, shelter, fuel and 
livelihoods to 1.6 billion people. In addition to functioning as sinks through their ability to 
sequester carbon, they regulate climate and water cycles and prevent soil erosion. As 
much as 65 per cent of the Earth’s land is owned, managed or occupied by the world’s 
370 million indigenous peoples, most of whom are directly dependent on forests and 
other ecosystems for survival (RRI, 2015). The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation 
estimates that there was a net loss of 88 million hectares (9 per cent of the total forest 
area) in Latin America between 1990 and 2010 and 75 million hectares (10 per cent) in 
Africa. It is estimated that forests store 652 Gigatonnes of CO2, about half in biomass 
(FAO 2010, 2012). Trees absorb between a quarter and a third of total carbon dioxide 
emissions (Reich, 2011). The main drivers of deforestation include legal and illegal 
logging, and forest clearance for cash crops and biofuels (IFF, 2000). In Philippe 
Sands’s view, “the destruction of tropical rainforests is probably the most dramatic and 
best known example of a national resource . . . becoming an international problem” 
(Sands 2003: xiv). For this reason, forests have become objects of governmentality 
under the United Nations Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) framework which seeks to enable forests to be simultaneously 
exploited and conserved. 
 
To have a 50 per cent chance of preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change, 
the fifth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment report 
concludes that CO2e emissions should not exceed 1210 gigatonnes of carbon (IPCC 
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2013: 27). The management of natural systems through land use, land use change, and 
forestry (LULUCF) activities are responsible for about 15–25 per cent of total 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Vermeulen et al., 2012). Tropical 
deforestation emits 0.8-0.9 Gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) annually, which equates to 8 
per cent of global carbon emissions. Tropical forest degradation accounts for a further 
0.6–1.5 GtC per annum, equating to 10-14 per cent of global carbon emissions 
(TPCISU 2015: 4). Deforestation contributes more to global emissions than all forms of 
transport or the combined GHG emissions of the world’s two biggest emitters, China 
and the United States (Van Der Werf et al., 2009). 
 
Tropical forests are objects of neoliberal environmental governmentality regimes which 
combine a range of discourses, rationalities and techniques and legal regimes with the 
aim of conserving them as sources of livelihoods and carbon sinks by treating them as 
sources of profit best managed by market forces.1 Neoliberal environmental 
governmenality is discussed in section 1, in which I discuss the two main discourses in 
the literature, green governmentality and ecological modernisation.Technological 
developments enable forests to be surveilled, monitored and measured and their 
inhabitants subjected to market discipline under REDD+ regime discussed in section 2. 
In section 4 I examine indigenous rights and the unexpected acquiescence of 
developed countries to the inclusion of REDD+ as a standalone article in the Paris 
Agreement. Section 4 analyses the vexed relationship between international 
                                            
1 Neoliberal environmental governmentality includes environmental governance includes climate 
governance. See Stripple and Bulkeley, 2014. 
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environmental law and neoliberal environmental governmentality. Conflicting principles 
and inadequate enforcement mechanisms limit the efficacy of international 
environmental law and suggest that effective forest governance that safeguards the 
interests of forest dwellers ultimately depends as much on political will as regulation. 
 
I. Neoliberal Environmental Governmentality 
 
Michel Foucault coined the neologism governmentality as shorthand for mentalities and 
techniques of governance that link knowledge and power to governmental rationality. 
Foucault analysed the ways by which neoliberal governmentality becomes pervasive 
but warned that neoliberalism should “not be identified with laissez-faire, but rather with 
permanent vigilance, activity and intervention” (Foucault 2008: 132). ‘Free’ markets 
require extensive state regulation best achieved through “a minimum of economic 
interventionism, and maximum legal interventionism” (Foucault 2008: 167). Foucault 
understood measurement, surveillance and monitoring are crucial mechansism of 
disciplinary and biopower. 
 
Ecogovernmentality emerged in the 1990s as a term covering theories that apply 
Foucault’s concepts of biopower and governmentality to the regulation of relations 
between human beings and the environment. They include ecological rationalities and 
technologies of government (Malette, 2009) and address, inter alia, (i) the production of 
expert knowledge about the environment, (ii) the construction of particular conceptions 
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of the environment as an object and environmental subjects, (iii) management of the 
environment through the globalisation of discourses of knowledge/power by individuals 
human and institutions, and (iv) the role of ideologies such as neoliberalism. Theories of 
ecogovernmentality link localised environmental management to national, regional, 
international and global mechanisms and structures of governance. 
 
Maria Lemos and Arun Agarwal (2006: 299) argue that four trends - globalisation, 
decentralised environmental governance, market- and individual-focused instruments, 
and governance across scales  have significantly shaped environmental governance. 
These trends are components of what I term neoliberal environmental governmentality. 
They are multi-scalar, predominantly techno-scientific discursive regimes of disciplinary 
and biopower in which power/knowledge is produced and wielded by changing 
combinations of actors in which states, international environmental institutions, the 
international financial institutions and transnational capital predominate but local regional 
and international non-state actors are also important. Since the 1980s, the most 
influential discourses of ecogovernmentality has been green governmentality and 
ecological modernisation. 
 
The emergence of climate change, arguably the biggest ecological threat facing 
humanity, led Angela Oels (2005) and Karin Bäckstrand and Eva Lövbrand (2006) to 
discern the emergence of a discursive shift in the 1990s signalled by the adoption of the 
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Kyoto Protocol from biopower to advanced liberal government.2 My own reading 
suggests a gradual transformation reflected the accommodation between the expanding 
power of markets and transnational capital one the one hand and the changing 
biopolitical role of security (and developmental) states as agents of and bulwarks 
against neoliberal globalization. States remain significant for three main reasons. First, 
they make and implement environmental policies, manage ecosystems and play a direct 
and fundamental role in producing and disciplining environmental subjects. Second, the 
power of sovereign states may have diminished in relation to transnational capital since 
the ascent of neoliberalism in the 1980s, not least due to the complicity of states 
themselves,3 but states continue to play a fundamental role in institutions of global 
environmental governance, even though their combined efforts too often lead to 
unsustainable outcomes. Third, states provide the economic, legal, political and social 
infrastructure required for environmental governmentality at all levels: sub-national, 
national, regional and international. 
 
The codependence of states and transnational capital results in hybrid forms of 
neoliberal environmental governmentality. Oels (2005: 32) discerns a reconfiguration of 
biopower in more overtly economic terms, and Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) 
describe the ways in which the dominant discourses of ecogovernmentality - green 
                                            
2 ‘Advanced liberal government introduces the market as organizing principle for all types of social 
organization including the state. Advanced liberal government employs market forces to guarantee 
freedom from excessive state intervention and bureaucracy’ (Oels 2005: 191). Others trace the 
discursive shift to the 1987 World Conference on Environment and Development.  
3 Deregulated markets, permissive tax regimes, widespread corruption, austerity, extractivism and the 
continued use of fossil fuels are not inevitabilities but political choices. 
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governmentality and ecological modernisation – are increasingly combined in climate 
governance. The “transition from biopower to advanced liberal government in the field of 
climate policy must be understood in the context of the global rise of neoliberalism in the 
late 1970s and 1980s” (Oels 2005: 198).4 
 
Timothy Luke (1996) introduced the concept of green governmentality to describe the 
power/knowledge nexus that emerges when the biosphere becomes the “ultimate 
domain of being” (Luke 1999: 150) and “a site of power, where truths are made, 
circulated, and remade” (Rutherford 2011: xvii), and an object of governance, requiring 
states to extend control beyond their territorial boundaries to ensure the security their 
populations (Luke 1999; 134).5 This occurred as evidence emerged of the limits and 
contradictions of economic growth and the rapidity with we are breaching planetary 
boundaries (Foster, Clark and York, 2010; Rockström et al. 2009). Green 
governmentality is a form of biopower that reinforces “the power of the administrative 
state in the name of responsible stewardship of nature” (Luke 1999: 129) and 
legitimises expanded governmental intervention.6 This leads to the 
“environmentalization” of the production of knowledge/power, the emergence of new 
forms of environmental knowledge and ecogovernmentality that prioritise ecology and 
                                            
4 Hajer (1997) discusses the continuities between green governmentality and ecological modernisation. 
5 Biopolitics emerged in the eighteenth centry when life itself became the object of politics and the ancient 
sovereign “right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of 
death” (Foucault 1978:138). In Foucault’s view, biopolitical techniques increase, protect and regulate life 
because power is productive and positive. The central contradiction of neoliberal environmental and 
climate governance is that it too often lets die. 
6 Disciplinary power transmogrifies into disciplinary neoliberalism through the multiple mechanisms and 
institutions by which capital disciplines states and non-state actors, primarily but not exclusively market 
mechanisms. States and the international economic institutions, amongst others, also play important roles 
alongside markets. See Gill (1995). 
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sustainability, and the reconfiguration of disciplinary power as “enviro-discipline” 
combining “the authority of eco-knowledgeable, geo-powered forces to police the fitness 
of all biological organisms and the health of their natural environments” (Luke 1999: 
146). Eco-science and environmental law produce the knowledge and personnel 
needed to render environment measurable, manageable for the expansion of capital. 
Governmentality is extended into every part of the biosphere through “an elitist and 
totalizing discourse that effectively marginalizes alternative understandings of the 
natural world” (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006: 55).7 Climate change is framed as a 
techno-scientific problem and prominent roles are given to multilateral institutions like 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)8 and IPPC, and 
increasingly as a security threat. 
 
Geopower defines ecological problems as transnational security threats that require 
global interventions. Eco-knowledge emerges in discourses such as sustainable 
development which are designed to manage but not eliminate the underlying problem of 
unconstrained extractivist economic growth. Enviro-disciplines normalise individual 
behaviour through the production of environmentally friendly market actors. 
Environmental technoscience makes possible the monitoring and surveillance of large 
populations and territories as environments become “spaces under police supervision, 
expert management or technocratic control” (Luke 1999: 149). 
                                            
7 There is a susbstantial and rapidly increasingly literature on global environmental constitutionalism that 
focuses primarily on the right to a safe and healthy environment. See for example Daly and May, 2015, 
Kotzé, (2016) and Bosselmann, (2016). 
8 Adopted 9 May 1992 and came into force on 21 March 1994. 1771 UNTS 107 / [1994] ATS 2 / 31 ILM 
849 (1992). 
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Ecological modernisation in its dominant weak form combines elements of biopower 
and liberalism and what Oels refers to as advanced liberal government. It evangelises 
the role of free markets and technological innovation as the most cost-efficient solutions 
negative environmental externalities and collective action problems such as climate 
change.9 Small states and limited government are policy goals of Austerian market 
fundamentalism make liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation at a time when strong 
state action is required to save people and the planet from anthropogenic warming.10 
Ecological modernisation views the environmental crises as opportunities to modernise 
and reinvent capitalism. Building on the anthropocentric dualisms that characterise 
Western modernity, it reconceptualises nature as a public (but not necessarily common) 
good susceptible to control through a combination of techno-scientific management and 
economic incentives. 
 
Sustainable development is the common denominator in these discourses. It is a widely 
accepted principle of international environmental law routinely incorporated into 
declarations, treaties and other instruments, and national, regional and international 
policy documents including the UNFCCC, the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable 
Development and the REDD+ framework.11 The concept initially emerged at the World 
                                            
9 Strong ecological modernisation demands broad public participation in environmental decision making 
and is more critical of the reformist capacity of political, economic and social institutions (Oels 2005: 196). 
10 ‘Good’ governance, the rule of law, free trade, protection of private property and security of contract 
take precedence over environmental issues. 
11 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Developement UNGA A/RES/70/71, 25 
September 2015. 
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Conference on Environment and Development in 1987 following publication of the 
report of the Brundtland Commission, which conceived development as a process that 
meets “the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987: 43). The Brundtland report exemplified 
ecological modernisation through “market based solutions, good governance, flexibility 
and cost efficiency” (Holmgren 2013: 370). Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006: 53) argue 
that its distinctive feature “is the compatibility of economic growth and environmental 
protection, a liberal market order and sustainable development” in contrast to the focus 
of green governmentality on centralised multilateral regimes such as the UNFCCC 
(Holmgren 2013: 370). It is a discourse of global power “tied to the modern 
administrative state, mega-science and big business. It entails the administration of life 
itself - individuals, populations and the natural environment” (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 
2006: 54). 
 
Sustainable development gained widespread acceptance at the 1992 Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro as a development paradigm which combines economic growth with 
environmental protection, and meets the (intra-generational) needs of the current 
generation – primarily through poverty alleviation – and safeguards the (inter-
generational) needs of future generations. Evading precise definition, it is sufficiently 
capacious to permit a wide range of interpretations and sufficiently malleable to actors 
as disparate as states, transnational corporations, the international financial institutions 
and civil society organisations to embrace it. Its vagueness is regarded by some as a 
strength but it is more vulnerable to the criticism that it fosters delusions such as 
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endless economic growth on a finite planet (Robinson, 2004). Wolfgang Sachs (1999) 
accurately described it as an oxymoron. Sustainable development becomes dangerous 
when it turns into an ideology that insidiously promotes the illusion that capitalism is 
compatible with sustainability. It is a leitmotif in the final document of the 2012 Rio+20 
conference on sustainable development, where it was reincarnated as “green economy 
in the context of sustainable development and poverty reduction,”12 the Paris 
Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals.13 
 
Climate change is framed primarily as an economic problem susceptible to governance 
through market mechanisms and technological solutions but states are still important 
not only because they facilitate markets and operate alongside non-state actors to 
induce behaviour that conforms with market rationality (Paterson and Stripple, 2010).14 
The Stern review describes climate change as “the greatest market failure in history.”15 
Climate change in a regime of biopower is produced by experts 
as an issue requiring global management, thereby making 
                                            
12 The Rio+ 20 final document contains numerous exhortations for the sustainable management of 
forests, conservation, reforestation and forest restoration but but no binding commitments. The Future We 
Want, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/288 (27 July 2012). It promotes trade in legally harvested 
forest products. See Adelman (2013 and 2015a) for extended critiques of green economy and sustainable 
development. 
13 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1. Transforming Our World: 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development CITATION. 
14 “[G]overnmentality and sovereignty are not mutually exclusive but that the latter embeds the former so 
that power is exercised in an advanced liberal way .... [A] Foucauldian perspective does not postulate a 
transfer of power from state to non-state actors, but that the state (as well as other actors) governs at a 
distance” (Methmann 2013: 79, 85). 
15 Stern (2007: 1). If markets were capable of dealing with climate change, we might expect them to have 
done so by now. The Stern review concluded that all countries will be affected by climate change, but 
developing countries will suffer earliest and most. It argued that the interests of future generations should 
be protected and advocated early investment in adaptation and mitigation. The review’s conclusions are 
controversial but it is reference point for all research on the economics of climate change. 
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government interventions look inevitable. Climate change as 
framed by biopower creates the basis for justifying far-ranging 
policy interventions and even the extension of state power in 
the name of ‘survival’ of life on planet Earth. Advanced liberal 
government, on the other hand, renders climate change 
governable as an issue of state failure requiring market-based 
solutions or the creation of markets. The extent to which action 
is to be taken on climate change is not a moral issue but 
instead a matter of cost-benefit analysis. (Oels, 2005: 201). 
 
By the time of the Rio+20 summit in 2012, it was taken for granted that markets could 
protect the environment and reduce GHG emissions through sustainable development 
in the context of poverty reduction and green economy, an orthodoxy further entrenched 
by the inclusion of REDD+ in Article 5 of the Paris Agreement. 
 
II. REDD+, Forest Governance and Neoliberal Environmental Governmentality 
 
The REDD mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation has been under negotiation in the UNFCCC since 2005 (Lyster, 2013). 
Forest degradation was included in the Bali Road Map at the thirteenth Conference of 
the Parties (COP) in 2007, which framed deforestation primarily as a problem of climate 
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governance.16 The Warsaw Framework on REDD+ was adopted at COP 19 in 
December 2013 with the aim of “reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries.”17 The plus element of REDD+ goes beyond reducing deforestation and 
forest degradation and includes conservation, sustainable management of forests, 
reforestation, and sequestration of GHGs. REDD+ is based on results-based finance 
from the Green Climate Fund which is forthcoming if host countries comply with a range 
of measurement reporting and verification (MRV) mechanisms such as collecting 
information on the drivers of deforestation, national forest monitoring methods, and 
providing information on safeguarding the rights of forest dwellers.18 
 
In its final form, REDD+ will comprise a complex array of institutions and technologies 
designed to bring forests under a marketised regime of carbon governmentality in which 
deforestation results from a misallocation of capital or the absence of adequate financial 
incentives. Forests are sites of ecosystem services and natural capital that have been 
incorrectly valued and must therefore be priced to reflect the carbon stored in them and 
enable compensation to be paid to those who forego the right to cut them down. REDD+ 
turns forests into fungible, tradable carbon storage services by extending property rights 
                                            
16 See Sands (2003: 545-551) and Boyd (2010a: 863-67) for a history of previous attempts to address 
deforestation under international environmental law prior to REDD. 
17 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its nineteenth session, held in Warsaw from 11 to 
23 November 2013 FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (31 January 2014). 
18 The Green Climate Fund is the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. It was 
established to provide funds to developing countries for adaptation and mitigation. became operational in 
2011. It aims to mobilise US $100 billion annually. At the time of writing, developed countries had 
contributed $10 billion. 
14 
over carbon and clarifying laws of tenure (Doherty and Schroeder, 2011). According to 
the UN Environment Programme, “unless people have clear rights over a resource, they 
will lack the incentive to manage it well” (UNEP 2011: 564-65).  
 
Forests have traditionally been governed at local or national levels but became objects 
of global environmental governmentality as soon as their importance in carbon 
sequestration, offsetting and trading was understood. REDD+ is the foremost example 
of a biopolitical regime that combines MRV mechanisms and resources derived from 
state contributions and market incentives as it becomes more deeply embedded in 
carbon markets in future. 
 
Forests are “a fundamental part of the earth’s ecological infrastructure and forest goods 
and services are important components of a green economy” (UNEP 2011a: 156). 
Consistent with this discourse, a multilevel system of payments for environmental 
services is being constructed locally, nationally and globally.19 “Many REDD+ projects 
plan to sell credits into voluntary carbon markets, and subject to international 
agreement, to global and regional compliance markets” (Boer 2013: 124). It is unlikely 
that forest carbon offsets will be included in the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme before 
2020 but REDD+-generated credits are being sold in voluntary carbon markets and this 
may increase following the Paris Agreement. Like other mechanisms in the UNFCCC 
                                            
19 FERN, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and Rainforest Foundation UK. 2011. REDD+ and carbon 
markets: Ten Myths Exploded, p. 3 <http://www.fern.org/10myths> (accessed 25 March 2014). 
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designed reduce emissions such as the Kyoto Protocol, the integration of REDD+ into 
carbon markets may prove to be of limited efficacy by enabling companies with 
compliance obligations to buy credits generated from projects in the global South to 
offset rather than reduce their GHG emissions. Joanna Cabello and Tamra Gilbertson 
(2012: 167) warn that “[a]lthough not yet explicitly connected to UN-backed carbon 
markets, even those REDD+ initiatives currently being supported by public money are 
generally designed to help jump-start forest carbon markets.” 
 
REDD+ is predicated upon the assumption that forests “suffer from multiple market 
failures in that neither the benefits that they produce nor the costs of their destruction 
are visible in economic terms” (UNEP 2011a: 8). The remedy for such failures is 
intensified marketisation since, as Andrew Jamison (2001: 96) tartly remarks, 
“capitalism has failed to deal adequately with environmental problems, because it has 
not been capitalist enough.” 
 
To its proponents, REDD+ combines cost efficiency, effective mitigation and sustainable 
development while protecting biodiversity and the rights and livelihoods of indigenous 
forest dwellers. It is a win-win framework that enables developing countries to be 
rewarded for reducing deforestation and emissions with financing and investment from 
industrialised countries who are able to offset their own emissions without reducing 
them (Stephan, Rothe and Methmann, 2014). There are fears that REDD+ may be 
undermined by corruption, land grabbing, insecure land tenure rights, measurement, 
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reporting and verification (MRV) fraud, evaluation and reporting, elite capture of REDD+ 
revenues, and leakage (Adelman, 2015a). 
 
REDD+ is a form of green governmentality that highlights “the ways in which business 
activity is both a response to, as well as constitutive of, environmental governance at 
the global level” (Levy and Newell, 2005: 2). In the logic of green capitalism, the optimal 
way of managing forests is through the abstract efficiency maximising, profit seeking 
homo economicus on whom neoclassical economics is constructed. And, consistent 
with neoliberal rationality, forests must be measured and quantified as units of carbon 
sequestration so that they can be priced and monitored, commodified and monetised.20 
This make it possible for results-based payments to be made contingent upon the ability 
of forest dwellers to demonstrate secure rights of access or tenure and regulatory 
regimes in which forests are effectively treated as private property even though, or 
especially when, such regimes clash with customary, collective, commons-based forms 
of governance. Lee Godden and Maureen Tehan (2016: 104) note that “The term 
‘tenure’ typically indicates a formalisation of rights in a state-based system – a situation 
that may not exist for many groups, even though the rights may be strongly grounded in 
the indigenous or local community ‘laws’”. They argue that “confusion around the 
interplay of tenure and ‘customary’ law has led to an overemphasis on ‘formalisation’ of 
current ‘tenure’ as the basis for REDD+ safeguards around indigenous and customary 
rights” (Godden and Tehan 2016: 86). Neoliberal environmental governmentality leads 
                                            
20 This is why neoliberalism consistently results in target-driven, instrumentalist managerialist cultures 
concerned with the price of everything and the value of nothing. 
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to unintended consequences even when conservation and the protection of indigenous 
rights are its primary aims because the trajectory of governance ultimately depends on 
whether forests are treated primarily as sources of use or exchange value. Tensions are 
inevitable when long-established communal forms of governance come into conflict with 
the REDD+ programme’s need to construct new active, responsible and accountable 
biopolitical environmental subjects (Agarwal, 2005) spurred to forest conservation as 
they becomed imbued with market logic – self-regulating market actors and forest 
managers to whom discipline appears more as choice than compulsion, neoliberal 
environmental subjects. Biopolitics governs populations through the imposition of 
certain types of freedom (Miller and Rose, 2008). 
 
Benjamin Stephan describes the emergence of new subjects like the carbon forester, 
who combines forestry skills, carbon accounting expertise, and knowledge of 
biochemistry and remote sensing technologies (Stephan, 2013). Ambrose-Oji et al. 
(2002: 159) discuss the ways in which the encouragement of communal forest 
management and “conservation-through-participation” disguise the surveillance, 
disciplining and control of forest dwellers for raisons d’etat and the interests of market 
actors.21 Surveillance and measurement technologies such as remote sensing by 
satellite make it possible to collect data on deforestation, land use, and land-use change 
and underpin MRV systems essential to forest governance (Boyd, 2010; Stephan, 
2012). They are core components of national mitigation programmes and the operation 
                                            
21 Death (2014) warns against an over-hasty assumption that governmentality is easily transposed from 
the local to the global and against conflating it with neoliberalism. 
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of carbon markets and facilitate expanded monitoring and surveillance of forested lands 
beyond the jurisdiction and control of states that “permits bureaucracies to pursue 
regulatory enforcement and judicial approaches to controlling illegal land-use and forest 
loss” (Boer 2013: 133). 
 
III. REDD+, Indigenous Rights and the Paris Agreement22 
 
REDD+ is based upon models of extractive development and environmental 
governance historically antagonistic to the interests of indigenous and poor peoples in 
the global South. Jesse Ribot and Anne Larson (2012: 248) argue that if it “is to 
challenge business as usual and to benefit local populations, safeguard policies must 
not just protect rights, but must also establish, strengthen, and secure rights.” The 2009 
Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change demanded that REDD 
initiatives: 
 
must secure the recognition and implementation of the human rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, including security of land tenure, ownership, recognition of 
land title according to traditional ways, uses and customary laws and the multiple 
                                            
22 For a brief history of REDD+ Godden and Tehan (2016) and Adelman (2015a). 
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beneﬁts of forests for climate, ecosystems, and Peoples before taking any 
action.23 
 
Appendix I to the Cancún Agreements signed at COP 16 outlines the safeguards that 
should be “promoted and supported” in REDD+ activities; including “respect for the 
knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities”.24 
Parties to the UNFCCC have agreed seven safeguards that do not define acceptable 
and unacceptable performance but merely require improvements beyond a minimum 
threshold (Client Earth, 2013: 18). The safeguards include transparent and effective 
national forest governance structures consistent with national legislation and 
sovereignty; respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members 
of local communities taking into account United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples; full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular 
indigenous peoples and local communities; and actions consistent with the conservation 
of natural forest and biological diversity to address the risks of reversals and to reduce 
displacement of emissions. Indigenous communities are not convinced that their rights 
and cultural ties to forests can be adequately recognised and protected under REDD+.25 
                                            
23 Anchorage Declaration, Report Indigenous Peoples’ Global Summit on Climate Change, Anchorage 
Alaska, 24 April 2009 <unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/ngo/168.pdf> accessed 4 February 2016 and 
the Margarita Declaration on Climate Change <http://www.redd-monitor.org/2014/08/08/the-margarita-
declaration-on-climate-change-we-reject-the-implementation-of-false-solutions-to-climate-change-such-
as-carbon-markets-and-other-forms-of-privatization-and-commodification-of-life/> accessed 4 February 
2016. 
24 The United Nations Cancún Agreements, 10 December 2010, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, Decision 
1/CP.16, Appendix 1, para. 2. On indigenous knowledges, see Adelman, 2015. 
25 Margarita Declaration on Climate Change <http://www.redd-monitor.org/2014/08/08/the-margarita-
declaration-on-climate-change-we-reject-the-implementation-of-false-solutions-to-climate-change-such-
as-carbon-markets-and-other-forms-of-privatization-and-commodification-of-life/> accessed 24 July 2016. 
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The Indigenous Environment Network describes it as a neo-colonial regime designed 
to co-opt traditional forest communities into neoliberal schemes that benefit others 
(Indigenous Forest Network, 2009). 
 
Article 5 in the Paris Agreement states that Parties should take action to conserve and 
enhance the sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases referred to in Article 4.1(d) of the 
UNFCCC and calls for “adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources” and 
incentivises efforts to reduce deforestation through a results-based approach. 
Paragraph 55 of the Paris Decision recognises “the importance of adequate and 
predictable financial resources, including for results-based payments . . . and positive 
incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.”26 
 
Although most countries were in favour of including explicit references to indigenous 
rights in the agreement there was robust disagreement about whether they should be 
confined to the preamble.27 Article 5 does not explicitly safeguard the rights of 
                                            
26 The provision of adequate resources for adaptation and mitigation has been a bone of contention 
throughout the history of the UNFCCC. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations demanded secure financing 
for REDD+ and developing countries have consistently argued that developed countries have an 
historical responsibility to provide adequate resources for adaptation, mitigation and climate-related loss 
and damage. See Adelman, (2016). 
27 Canada, the Philippines, Mexico and the members of the Independent Association of Latin America 
and the Caribbean strongly in favour but other countries - most notably Brazil, a longstanding opponent of 
the inclusion of REDD+ in any treaty - objected to any reference to the REDD regime on the basis that all 
previous decisions, including the methodological framework and the safeguards information system are 
already contained in the Warsaw Framework for REDD+. The main concern of opponents was that 
including indigenous rights in the operative part of the Agreement might create legal liabilities in domestic 
and regional tribunals. Bergen, Molly ‘Experts: Paris Agreement falls short on indigenous rights’, 
humanature, 17 December 2015 <http://blog.conservation.org/2015/12/expert-paris-agreement-falls-
short-on-indigenous-rights/> accessed 5 February 2016. 
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indigenous forest dwellers but it has been argued that the related guidance and 
decisions in the article refer to “critically important REDD+ safeguards . . . designed to 
protect natural forests and their biodiversity as well as the rights of indigenous peoples 
and local communities. Most importantly, it includes a system to report on how those 
safeguards are addressed and respected.”28 Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, argues that the Paris Agreement does 
not adequately protect indigenous peoples’ rights, is likely to fuel destruction of forests 
and other ecosystems managed by indigenous peoples and lead to social conflict that 
will exact tremendous economic harm because “our forests are our homes, our lives, 
our culture, and the heart of our spirituality.”29 
 
The inclusion of REDD+ in a standalone article was widely welcomed, but concern has 
been expressed that the Paris Agreement is tantamount to a trade agreement likely to 
“privatize, commodify and sell forested lands as carbon offsets in fraudulent schemes 
such as REDD+ projects. These offset schemes provide a financial laundering 
mechanism for developed countries to launder their carbon pollution on the backs of the 
global South.”30 
 
                                            
28 Forests Embraced for First Time in Climate Negotiations, December 14, 2015 
<http://reddplussafeguards.com/climate-change-land-use/redd-safeguards-working-group/> accessed 4 
February 2016. 
29 Removing Rights for Indigenous Peoples Places Forests, Climate Plan at Risk. Statement from Paris, 
COP21 <http://unsr.vtaulicorpuz.org/site/index.php/en/statements/106-statement-cop21> accessed 1 
February 2016. 
30 Human rights attorney and Indigenous Environmental Network counsel Alberto Saldamando 
<http://indigenousrising.org/indigenous-peoples-take-lead-at-d12-day-of-action-in-paris-official-response-
to-cop21-agreement/> accessed 24 January 2016. 
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IV. Neoliberal Environmental Governmentality and International Environmental 
Law 
 
International environmental law is a discourse of neoliberal environmental 
governmentality distinct from green governmentality and ecological modernisation but 
equally concerned with environmental protection and sustainability. It is compatible with 
green governmentality because it is designed to manage the environment, including 
territory under sovereign jurisdiction, as property and differs from ecological 
modernisation because it perpetuates a sovereign-centric, hierarchical vision of 
ecogovernmentality. As Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk (1992: 192) argue that the 
Westphalian system is poorly equipped to embody ecological principles and address 
environmental challenges because “[i]ts approach to the ecological dilemma is 
confounded by its institutional interests, instrumental role and domain of authority, 
which are at odds with ecological principles and global ethos required for planetary 
management.” Climate change is fundamentally a transboundary problem, but state 
sovereignty is incompatible with problems that require collaborative cosmopolitan 
solutions (Adelman, 2011). Henry Shue (2014: 150) argues in favour of binding limits on 
the right of states to pursue domestic economic goals through measures akin to the jus 
cogens prohibition against torture regardless of their willingness to accepts such 
constraints. 
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The disciplinary power of transnational capital often seems to be greater than that of 
international environmental law because the latter is riven by contradictory and largely 
unenforceable principles such as sustainable development. International environmental 
law is, however, singularly effective in hindering the emergence of alternatives to private 
property and sovereignty such as commons (Capra and Mattei, 2015). 
 
Sands (2003) identifies seven principles of international environmental law including 
sovereignty over natural resources accompanied by the responsibility not to cause 
transboundary environmental damage; preventive action; the principle of co-operation; 
sustainable development; the precautionary principle; the polluter-pays principle; and 
common but differentiated responsibility. No principle has precedence because there is 
no clear hierarchy so that “the absence of judicial authority and in view of the conflicting 
interpretations under state practice, it is frequently difficult to establish the parameters 
or the precise international legal status of each general principle or rule” (Sands 2003: 
231). As Bosselmann (2010: 2424) wryly observes, “environmental laws and policies 
have saved some ‘trees’, but the ‘forest’ is being lost as critical global issues including 
climate change, biodiversity loss, and our ecological footprint continue to worsen.” 
 
The presence of conflicting principles is common in documents such as the UNFCCC, 
which notes the sovereign right of states to exploit their natural resources and their duty 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not damage the 
24 
environment of other countries in the preamble.31 The principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources originated in the 1950s as a manifestation of the 
right to self-determination. Developing countries were concerned that transnational 
corporations were the main beneficiaries of the natural resources they regarded as their 
national patrimony (Schrijver,1997). In 1966, the UN General Assembly recognised “the 
inalienable right of all countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources in the interest of their national development.”32 
 
There is a sovereign prerogative to exploit forests as natural resources but soil 
degradation and erosion, species extinction, and the destruction of natural habitats and 
carbon sinks appear to contravene the injunction to do no harm and the requirement for 
states to co-operate to protect the environment. As David Takacs observes, “Once 
intact forests are deemed essential to mitigating GHG buildup, they inch closer to an 
international resource that states no longer control” (Takacs 2013: 704). Mechanisms 
like REDD+ are effectively “debates over sovereignty, whether or not they’re framed 
in those terms” (Takacs 2013: 700). 
 
Natural resources can be designated as the common heritage of humankind under 
international environmental law and obligations imposed on states to protect common 
                                            
31 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration (slightly modified by Principle 2 of the Rio Earth Summit 
Declaration) is similarly phrased. Sands (2003: 236) regards this principle as “the cornerstone of 
international environmental law.” In contrast, French (2001: 381) views the Stockholm Declaration’s no 
harm rule as the “most fundamental rule of modern international environmental law.” 
32 G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), UN GAOR, Twenty-First Session (1966). 
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resources under their territorial jurisdiction. Examples of global commons to which all 
states have access include Antarctica, the high seas, the atmosphere and space. Ann 
Hooker (1994) and Dan Tarlock (1997) argue that the function of forests in mitigating 
climate change dictates that they be governed as global commons, but the principle is 
not universally accepted and belied by state practice. The incompatibility of these 
principles leads Nico Schrijver to suggest that the heritage of mankind regime can only 
start at the point at which the permanent sovereignty principle ends (Schrijver 1997: 
229). Developing countries are concerned that calls to treat forests as the common 
heritage of humanity, as global commons or regulating them under an international 
climate regime “will increase pressure for a de facto internationalisation of tropical 
forests given their role in the global carbon cycle and their importance to climate 
protection efforts” (Boyd 2010a: 880, fn. 144)33 In Boyd’s view, attempts since the early 
1990s to construct “a comprehensive international legal instrument on forests have 
foundered on the fundamental conflict between the conception of tropical forests as the 
‘common heritage of mankind’ and forests as sovereign national resources” (Boyd 
2010a: 865). Framing deforestation as a problem of climate governance will not 
succeed because: 
 
deforestation is not a unitary phenomenon amenable to easy generalization, much 
less global governance. Previous ways of seeing the problem . . . have not 
                                            
33 Sands (2003: 546-47) argues that “Attempts by developed countries to ‘internationalise’ forest issues 
have so far been unsuccessful in legal terms, and the tropical forest resources of developing countries 
are carefully guarded as part of the national patrimony of these countries”. Mgbeoji (2003: 828) views the 
notion of common heritage as “a barely disguised ideological tool in the politics of and struggle for control 
of plant genetic resources across the globe.” 
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provided a sufficient foundation for effective governance, raising the important 
question of whether a climate policy approach to deforestation (a very different 
way of seeing the problem) will succeed where past efforts have failed. (Boyd 
2010a: 866). 
 
Paradoxically, “[S]overeignty over natural resources is not “permanent” - or even 
temporary - if forests degrade or disappear due to changing ecological conditions” 
(Takacs 2013: 710). Tarlock calls for a modified conception of sovereignty reflected in: 
 
erga omnes duties to require more sustainable use of national territories such as 
tropical rainforests and wetland systems. The legal rationale is that the 
potential adverse global impacts of ecosystem modification may make them part 
of the common heritage of mankind or a matter of common concern or common 
interest. (Tarlock 2007: 587). 
 
Scholtz (2008) argues in favour of a form of custodial sovereignty that respects the right 
of states to exploit their natural resources but also creates the expectation that these 
resources will be protected on behalf of humanity. Other states would be obliged to 
assist the custodian state to fulfil its obligations consistent with the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities.34 
                                            
34 Glennon (1990) makes a similar argument. 
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International environmental law is increasingly characterised by á la carte voluntarism of 
which the Paris Agreement is the latest conspicuous example, and inadequate 
enforcement.35 Humphreys (2006: 215) argues that states are now takers as much as 
makers of standards in governance regimes increasingly characterised by market 
rationalities and “voluntary alternatives to state regulation and intergovernmental 
regimes” (Humphreys 2006: 223). 
 
Conclusion 
Since the IPCC issued its first assessment report in 1990, the rule of markets has 
trumped the rule of law, growth fetishism has trumped environmental protection, and 
profit has trumped people’s rights. Deforestation has continued apace, greenhouse 
gases have not been reduced, and three planetary environmental boundaries have 
been transgressed - biodiversity loss, climate change, and the nitrogen cycle - and a 
further six are under threat (Rockström et al. 2009). REDD+ combines biopower and 
green governmentality with market power and the rationality of ecological 
modernisation. Time will tell whether REDD+ is an adequate framework for reducing 
deforestation, emissions and biodiversity loss while protecting the livelihoods of those 
who depend on tropical forests to survive. Saving forests and the planets requires 
                                            
35 The Sustainable Development Goals are entirely voluntary, have no enforcement mechanisms and 
dubious status under international law. 
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resistance to neoliberal environmental governmentality rather than the production of 
subjects compatible with the sustainable development. 
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